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Abstract
This paper investigates the pass-through of an excise tax imposed on a
monopoly … rm with constant marginal cost. The optimal price increases as
tax increases for any demand function. Tax pass-through is globally under or
in excess of 100% according as the direct demand function is log-concave or
log-convex. The analysis relies on supermodular optimization and delivers con-
clusions based on minimal su¢cient assumptions in a simple, broadly accessible
and self-contained framework. Further results allow for mixed conditions that
provide precise and local determination of pass-through. Several illustrative ex-
amples are given. Policy conclusions relating to the relative wisdom of taxing
high versus low cost monopoly … rms are drawn from the results.
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11 Introduction
The theory of taxation has been part of the world of modern economics from en
early stage (see e.g. Wicksell, 1896). Of the many strands of literature on the topic,
one of the more active … elds of research in recent years is the theory of taxation of
… rms in a partial equilibrium framework (Suits and Musgrave, 1953, Seade, 1985,
Kimmel, 1992, Hamilton, 1999, and Anderson, de Palma and Kreider, 2001, among
others.) The latter study provides in its introduction a detailed historical account of
the importance of taxation in most economies, and we simply refer the reader there
for a complete motivation of the economic importance of the topic at hand.
In this literature, the private and the public e¤ects of taxation are investigated for
various market structures. While the earlier studies typically dealt with monopoly and
perfect competition, more recent work considered mostly oligopolistic competition.
The incidence of taxation can be in the form of ad valorem or speci… c taxes, imposed
either on the revenue side or the production side of the market.
The present paper deals with the e¤ects of a per-unit unit tax on production
levied on a monopoly … rm with constant marginal cost facing a general market de-
mand curve. The central issue raised in this paper is to determine the most general
conditions under which the behavior of a monopoly … rm in response to such a form of
taxation can be fully characterized. As this issue has received quite a few treatments
in the past, within various market structures, one of the … rst things that comes to
mind is to justify why this problem deserves a new look at all. The main reason is
that previous treatments have not explicitly sought to provide minimally su¢cient
conditions under which their conclusions are valid.
In view of the fact that the issue at hand is essentially a comparative statics
problem, it is natural to approach it using the new, lattice-theoretic, methodology for
handling such problems. By introducing the technique of supermodular optimization1
1This theory was developed by Topkis (1978), and further extended by Vives (1990), Milgrom
and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and Athey (2002). Applications to oligopoly that
2into this literature, we arrive at tight, simple and clear-cut conditions that validate the
derived conclusions, most of which have less general antecedants. More speci… cally,
by dispensing with the need for second-order conditions, a necessity if one uses the
traditional methods based on the Implicit Function Theorem applied to the … rst-
order conditions, one arrives at su¢cient conditions that are critical for the desired
conclusion, and hence meaningfully interpretable from an economic point of view.
To illustrate these points clearly, let us provide a preview of our main results.
Using price as the decision variable of the … rm, it is shown that the optimal price will
always increase with the tax rate, assuming no … rst or second-order properties on the
direct demand function at all. Thus a monopoly … rm will increase its optimal price
in response to an increase in the tax rate even if demand is not globally decreasing,
concave, or even continuous, provided the … rm’ s pro… t maximization problem admits
an optimal price. As to the question of assessing the size of the tax pass-through – i.e.
how much price increases relative to the increase in the tax rate in percentage terms
–the answer is that it is less than 100% if the direct demand function is log-concave
and more than 100% if it is log-convex. As there is no explicit need for a second-
order condition that would be common to these two mutually exclusive cases, the
underlying mutually exclusive assumptions fully explain the result from an intuitive
point of view. The paper also provides some insight and results about some speci… c
cases of local determination of the tax pass-through.
While the main contribution of the paper may be deemed more methodological,
it remains nevertheless true that the derived results are quite interesting from an
economic point of view as well. Several illustrative examples are given all along the
paper that enhance the readability of the general analysis, and provide an immediate
sense of the usefulness of the results. Some of these examples would violate the
second-order conditions of most previous treatments of tax pass-through, and thus
inspired the present paper are Amir (1996) and Amir and Lambson (2000). Topkis (1998) and Vives
(1999) o¤er book-level treatments.
3would not quite … t the known results in a clear-cut manner.
While this paper is con… ned to the monopoly case, an extension of the analysis
to oligopolistic competition would be of substantial interest for future research. The
same approach is conjectured to be appropriate in that context as well, and will likely
yield new insights into the issue at hand.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the de… nitions
and results from supermodular optimization that will be used in this paper, in an
extremely simpli… ed form that is su¢cient for our purposes here. The results and
the associated ilustrations are given in Section 3. A … nal section summarizes some
aspects of policy relevance that may be drawn from the results.
2 Mathematical Preliminaries
Consider a parametrized family of optimization problems, where ½ is a parameter
set,  ½  ½ (for some action set  ) is the set of feasible actions when the
parameter is   and : £ ! is the objective function:

¤( ) = argmaxf (   ) :  2   g (1)
The aim is to derive su¢cient conditions on the objective and constraint set that
yield monotone optimal argmax’ s.
A function : £ ! is (strictly) supermodular2 in (   ) if 8 0    0 
 (
0 
0) ¡  (
0  )( ) ¸  (  
0) ¡  (   ) (2)
or in other words if the di¤erence  (¢  0) ¡  (¢  ) is an increasing function3.
For smooth functions, supermodularity admits a convenient test (Topkis, 1978)4
2This is really the notion of increasing di¤erences, which in  2 is equivalent to supermodularity.
3Throughout, a function : ! is increasing (decreasing) if ¸ )  ( ) ¸ (·) ( ). It is
strictly increasing (decreasing) if  )  ( ) ( ) ( ).
4Furthermore, if  2 (   )    0 then is strictly supermodular. On the other hand, the
reverse implication need not hold.
4Lemma 1 If is twice continuously di¤erentiable, supermodularity is equivalent to
 2 (   )     ¸ 0 for all and  .
Supermodularity formalizes the usual notion of complementarity: Having more of
one variable increases the marginal returns to having more of the other variable.
A simpli… ed version of Topkis’ s (1978) Monotonicity Theorem is now given. It is
assumed throughout that is continuous (or even just upper semi-continuous) in 
for each   so that the max in (1) is attained. Furthermore, the correspondence  ¤( )
then admits maximal and minimal selections, denoted  ( ) and  ( ) respectively.
Theorem 2 Assume that
(i) is supermodular in (   ), and
(ii)  = [ ( )  ( )] where    : ! are increasing functions with  ·  .
Then the maximal and minimal selections of  ¤( )  ( ) and  ( ) are increasing
functions. Furthermore, if (i) is strict, then every selection of  ¤( ) is increasing.
Sometimes, one might be interested in having a strictly increasing argmax.
Theorem 3 Assume is continuously di¤erentiable,     is strictly increasing in
and the argmax is interior. Then every selection of  ¤( ) is strictly increasing.
Since supermodularity is equivalent to     being increasing in  , the assump-
tion in Theorem 3 is a minor strengthening of the supermodularity of (see Amir,
1996 or Edlin and Shannon, 1997 or Topkis, 1998 p.71 for a proof and further details.)
There are order-dual versions to all the above results. We state just the main one,
giving obvious dual conditions under which an argmax is decreasing in the parameter.
A function : £! is (strictly) submodular if ¡is supermodular, i.e. if (2)
holds with the inequality reversed.
Theorem 4 Assume that
(i) is submodular in (   ), and
5(ii)  = [ ( )  ( )] where    : ! are decreasing functions with  ·  .
Then the maximal and minimal selections of  ¤( ) are decreasing functions. Fur-
thermore, if (i) is strict, then every selection of  ¤( ) is decreasing.
We say that a function  :  + ¡!  + is log-concave (log-convex) if logis
concave (convex). The corresponding strict notions are de… ned in the obvious way.
The following is a common way for supermodularity to arise.
Lemma 5 A function  :  + ¡!  + is log-concave (log-convex) if and only if
 ( +  ) is log-submodular (log-supermodular) in (   ).
For a smooth function  :  + ¡!  +, log-concavity (log-convexity) is easily
checked to be equivalent to
 ( )
00( ) ¡ [
0( )]
2 · (¸)0 for all   (3)
The corresponding strict notions are given by (3) with a strict inequality.
3 Set-up and Results on Pass-Through
In this section, the problem at hand, dealing with the e¤ects of taxation on optimal
price and pro… t, is laid out and analyzed. Global results are stated and proved in the
… rst subsection while results with some local ‡ avor appear in the second subsection.
Consider a monopoly … rm with constant unit cost   charging a price  ¸ 0 facing
a tax  per unit output, and operating in a market with a direct demand function
: [0 1) ¡! [0 1) The pro… t function is then (with  viewed as a … xed parameter
and  as a variable parameter)
¦(   ) = ( ¡  ¡  )( ) (4)
The issues at hand may alternatively be approached from the other well-known and
equivalent formulation of the monopoly problem, namely, with  (¢) denoting the
6inverse demand function (i.e. =  ¡1), to choose an output level  so as to
maxf (   ) =   ( ) ¡ ( +  ) :  ¸ 0g (5)
It turns out that an analysis based on price as the decision variable is more natural
here, as our interest is mostly in the comparative statics property of the optimal price.
As the price choices in [0  +  ) are clearly dominated by the choice of  =  +  
we may, and often will … nd it convenient, to restrict prices to the set  2 [ +   1)
Without further mention, the following assumption will be maintained (for con-
venience) throughout this paper:
(A1) The demand function is a continuous function.
With  … xed, denote optimal pro… t for a given tax level by
¦
¤( ) = maxf¦(   ) :  ¸  +  g
3.1 Results of a Global Nature
The results here are extensions or generalizations of existing results in the literature.
The added generality is achieved via our use of supermodularity techniques, and
is manifested in the abscence of customary assumptions of interiority of solutions,
smoothness of the model functions, and second-order type conditions (i.e. some form
of concavity of the pro… t function.)
Our … rst result deals with the dependence of optimal pro… t on the tax rate.
Proposition 6 Under Assumption (A1) alone, ¦¤( ) is a decreasing convex function.
Proof. Let  0  . Since ¦(   0) · ¦(   ) and the feasible sets are such that
[ + 0 1) ½ [ +  1), it follows that ¦¤( ) ¸ ¦¤( 0). Hence ¦¤( ) is decreasing in  .
To show convexity, observe that ¦¤( ) is the pointwise supremum of an (uncount-
able) family of a¢ne functions in  . It follows directly from a well-known result in
convex analysis (Rockaefellar, 1970, p. 35) that ¦¤( ) is convex.
7Thus the marginal decline in a monopoly’ s pro… t due to one extra unit in the tax
rate decreases with the … rm’ s cost. Another economic implication of this result is
that a … rm would always prefer a lottery on the tax rate to the sure incidence of the
expected value of that lottery.
As the optimal price is invariant under a strictly monotonic transformation, we
may equivalently consider the objective
log¦(   ) = log( ¡  ¡  ) + log( )   2 [ +   1) (6)
Denote the optimal price correspondence by  ( ) throughout (we omit the dependence
on  for simplicity, it being understood that the variable parameter below is  .)
Proposition 7 Under Assumption (A1) and the additional assumption that ( +
 ) 0 for all  0 and  ( ) ¡! 0 as  ¡! 1, every selection from the optimal
price  ( ) is strictly increasing in  
Proof. From the assumption that ( +  ) 0 for all  0 and  ( ) ¡! 0
as ¡! 1, it follows that there exists 2 ( +   +1) such that ¦(   ) 0 and
lim !+1¦(   ) · 0 for all  . Since, ¦( +   ) = 0, there is an interior price argmax
for all ¸ 0. In addition, log¦(   ) has the property that
 log¦(   )
  = 1
( ¡ ¡ ) is
strictly increasing in  , therefore the conclusion follows directly from Theorem 3.
While a version of this result is broadly known, observe that the present statement
is stronger than usual, in that the demand function need not be decreasing or even
continuous in own price for this conclusion to hold5! Furthermore, no second-order
condition is needed either here, whereas standard treatments will invariably assume
some sort of concavity condition on the demand or the pro… t functions. The latter
are often violated by some commonly used demand functions, such as those of the
hyperbolic family, and constitute thus rather restrictive assumptions for deriving the
5All that is really needed is for to be upper semi-continuous in instead of Assumption (A1),
so that maximizing pro… t amounts to maximizing an upper semi-continuous function on a compact
set, and then invoking Weirstrass’ s classical theorem.
8natural conclusion that a higher tax will lead to a higher price by a monopoly … rm,
which as demonstrated by Proposition 7, is an essentially universal result.
Due to the abscence of a second-order condition, there may be no selection of the
optimal price correspondence that is a continuous function ot  here, so that standard
comparative statics methods relying on the implicit function theorem and … rst-order
conditions are not applicable to derive Proposition 7 in the present level of general-
ity. This result provides a simple illustration of the fact that the supermodularity
approach typically yields comparative statics conclusions that rely only on critically
needed assumptions on the primitives of a model.6
It follows directly from this result that the extremal selections from the optimal
output correspondence are decreasing in  , a conclusion that can also be obtained by
invoking Topkis’ s Theorem directly on the output formulation of the monopoly prob-
lem since the pro… t function in (5) is submodular in (   ) for any demand function.
We now investigate further the upward reaction of price to an increase in the
tax rate by comparing the size of the former to the size of the latter. To this end,
a convenient change of variable will allow a very simple treatment of the question.
De… ne mark-up (over the sum of marginal cost and tax) as ,  ¡  ¡  , and write
the equivalent objective with this change of variable as
e ¦(  ) , (+  +  ) with =  ¡  ¡  (7)
As before, we will also need to consider the alternative objective
log e ¦(  ) , log() + log(+  +  ) (8)
The … rst result provides a su¢cient condition for tax pass-through to be below 100%
6Here, the customary assumptions of continuity, monotonicity and concavity of the demand func-
tions are super‡ uous conditions, the need for which arises from using the inadequate methodology of
the implicit function theorem. As a consequence, such assumptions might interfere with an attempt
to provide a precise economic interpretation for the result at hand, in view of the fact that they do
not constitute critical limitations to the economic environment, which drive the comparative statics
conclusion. Similar remarks will apply to other results derived in this paper.
9Proposition 8 If is log-concave, then there is a unique optimal price  ( ) for each
  and it satis… es 0 
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ · 1 for all  0  , and is thus Lipschitz continuous.
Proof. Since  is log-concave, log e ¦(  ) is strictly concave in  (being the
sum of a strictly concave function and a concave function). It follows that ( ) is
single-valued and continuous. Hence so is  ( ) As ( ) ,  ( )¡ ¡ , it follows that
 ( ) has all slopes · 1 if and only if ( ) is decreasing. We now establish the latter
conclusion.
By Lemma 5, (+  +  ) is log-submodular in (  ) and so is ¦(  ). Since
the constraint on , [0 1), is constant in   we conclude from Theorem 4 that ( )
is globally decreasing in   Since ( ) =  ( ) ¡  ¡   this is equivalent to the fact
that
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ · 1 The overall conclusion (including Lipschitz continuity) follows by
combining the latter slope condition with the fact that from Proposition 7, we know
that 0 
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ .
Overall then, with log-concave demand, there is always positive but partial pass-
through. A discussion of the level of generality of this proposition is postponed until
the end of the statement of the results, although the reader unfamiliar with the
notions of log-concavity might … nd it worthwhile to read the discussion … rst.
The next result strengthnens log-concavity of demand, i.e.  00 ¡  02 · 0 or
0(¢)
(¢) being a decreasing function, to the strict version of the latter condition, and
obtains a strict Lipschitz condition on the optimal price, as well as some handle on
its interiority.
Proposition 9 Assume that is continuously di¤erentiable on [0 1), and that
(i) ( +  ) 0 for some  0 and  ( ) ¡! 0 as  ¡! 1
(ii)
0(¢)
(¢) is a strictly decreasing function.
Then there is a unique optimal price for each  and some such that 0 
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ 1 for all   0 ·  and  ( ) =  +   for  ¸  
Proof. From the assumption in (i), it follows that marginal revenue  ( ) =
( )+( ¡ ¡ ) 0( ) satis… es  ( + ) 0 (when  is small) and  ( ) 0 for 
10large enough. Hence, there is an interior price argmax, at least for su¢ciently small
values of  (for a given   ) Uniqueness of the optimal price holds from Proposition 8
since (ii) is stronger than log-concavity of (as explained in the sentence preceding
Proposition 9.)
Since
 log  ¦(  )
  =
0(+ + )
(+ + ) is strictly decreasing in  , it follows from the obvious
dual to Theorem 3 that, whenever interior, ( ) is strictly decreasing in  
Since ( ) =  ( ) ¡  ¡   this is equivalent to the fact that
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ 1 for all
 0  such that  ( ) is interior.
However, as  increases, there will come a point where  ( ) can no longer remain
interior (i.e.  + ), due to the fact that demand is … xed here (so that by assumption
(i) of the Proposition, pro… ts would eventually turn negative.) So for large enough  
we must have ( +  ) = 0 and hence  ( ) =  +  .
As the 0 bound on the slopes of  ( ) follows from previous results, the proof is
now complete.
The next result provides a su¢cient condition for tax pass-through to exceed 100%
in a global sense.
Proposition 10 (a) If is log-convex, then the extremal selections from the optimal
price  ( ) satisfy
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ ¸ 1 for all  0  
(b) If
0(¢)
(¢) is a strictly increasing function, then all the selections from the optimal
price  ( ) satisfy
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ 1 for all  0  whenever  ( ) is interior.
Proof. (a) The objective function in (8) is supermodular in (  ) if  is log-
convex, by Lemma 5. Since the constraint set, 2 [0 1) is of the form speci… ed in
Theorem 2, it follows from the latter result that the maximal and minimal selections
from the optimal mark-up ( ) are increasing in   or equivalently that the extremal
selections of  ( ) have all their slopes ¸ 1
(b) When log-convexity is strengthened to
0(¢)
(¢) being a strictly increasing function,
the conclusion in (a) is strengthened to hold in a strict sense, whenever  ( ) is interior,
for all possible selections, as follows directly from Theorem 3.
11We now discuss the scope of these results. The assumption of log-concavity is only
mildly restrictive for a direct demand function7. Assuming smoothness, it is easier
to grasp the level of generality of this assumption. As log-concavity is equivalent to
(see Lemma 1)

2 log(+  )    = [
00 ¡ 
02] 
2 · 0 or 
00 ¡ 
02 · 0
it is clearly su¢cient to have demand being concave or even not too convex. Most
demand functions used in industrial economics satisfy log-concavity, including linear
demand ( ) = ¡    quadratic demand ( ) = ¡   2 etc... The limiting
case is ( ) =  ¡ , which is both convex and log-linear, thus also both log-concave
and log-convex. An important class of demand functions that is excluded by log-
concavity is the family of hyperbolic demands, including the well-known iso-elastic
demand ( ) = 1   1 These functions are, on the other hand, log-convex.
This property is rather restrictive for a demand function, as it requires a strong form
of convexity ( 00 must be su¢ciently positive so as to make  00 ¡  02 ¸ 0) 8
As illustration of these results, consider the following widely used examples in
industrial organization. The … rst example has a log-concave demand.
Example 11 Consider the standard linear demand: ( ) =  ¡ for  ·  and 0 for
 ¸  , which is clearly concave, and thus log-concave. Then ¦(   ) = ( ¡ ¡ )( ¡ ).
7It … rst appeared in Amir (1996) as the most general assumption on the inverse demand function
that guarantees that the reaction correspondence of a … rm in Cournot competition is downward-
sloping, irrespective of the curvature properties of its cost function. See also Novshek (1985) for an
alternative condition.
8There are some other hidden implications of log-concavity and log-convexity that are worthwhile
to point out here. A necessary condition for log-convexity of a downward-sloping demand is that ( )
be 0 for all  ¸ 0, i.e that the function never touch the  -axis (see Amir, 1996 for justi… cations).
Similarly, for demand functions a priori de… ned on (0 1), such as isoelastic demands, log-concavity
requires that (0) be … nite.
12A standard calculation yields




( +  +  ) 2 if  +  · 






1 2 if  +  · 
1 if  +  ¸ 
So tax pass-through is 50% here, independently of the value of  .
The second example has a log-convex demand.
Example 12 Isoelastic demand: ( ) = 1
  1  ¸ 0




  is here
equal to ¡ , a negative constant independent of the output level.
Here ¦(   ) =
( ¡ ¡ )
  
A standard calculation shows that
 ( ) =
 + 
1 ¡ (1  )
and








1 for all  
Hence, pass-through is again constant, but above 100%.
These examples are well-known (see for instance Varian, 1992 p. 237). Proposi-
tions 8 and 10 are to be regarded then as natural generalizations of these particular
illustrations, respectively.
The following example lies at the intersection of Propositions 8 and 10. It is
obviously not a commonly used demand function, although for all relevant purposes
for the issue at hand, it lies in the intermediate range between the previous commonly
used examples.
Example 13 Let ( ) =  ¡   ¸ 0
As this demand is log-linear, thus both log-concave and log-convex, Propositions 8 and
10 imply that
 
 is · 1 and ¸ 1, respectively. Hence we should have
 
 = 1
Here ¦(   ) = ( ¡  ¡  ) ¡  The … rst-order condition reduces to  ¡¡ ( ¡  ¡
 ) ¡= 0, so that, as expected,
 ( ) =  +  + 1 and
  ( )
 
= 1
13As to the economic intuition behind the results on the size of pass-through, it is
quite staightforward. Recall that an increase in the tax rate always leads to an output
reduction (see (5) and the discussion below it). When demand is log-convex, thus
strongly convex, the output reduction translates into a price increase at an increasing
rate, whence the more than 100% pass-through. In the presence of several Cournot
competitors, there is a stronger version of this result owing to the underlying strategic
e¤ects (see e.g. Seade, 1985.)
3.2 Results with a Local Flavor
To recapitulate, Proposition 7 tells us that the price pass-through of an excise tax is
always positive, and Propositions 8 and 10 provide respective su¢cient global con-
ditions on the direct demand function under which pass-through is below or above
100%. Nevertheless, as lots of plausible demand functions are neither globally log-
concave nor globally log-convex, the results so far do obviously not capture the full
scope of possible behavior of tax pass-through. Put di¤erently, there are many rea-
sonable demand functions for which tax pass-through may change from being less
than, to being more than, 100%, depending on the level of the … rm’ s marginal cost  .
We now investigate such hybrid cases and present a general result dealing with the
varying size of pass-through.
To this end, we begin with an observation to the e¤ect that Proposition 8 does
not provide minimally su¢cient conditions for its conclusion. To illustrate this point,
consider the following example.
Example 14 Let ( ) = ¡logfor  · 1 and 0 for  ¸ 1.
The pro… t function is ¦(   ) = ¡( ¡  ¡  )log  with  +  · 1.
To check log-concavity/convexity, we compute, by direct di¤erentiation,















02 Q 0 according as  R 
¡1 t 0 368 (9)
Hence, is log-convex for  2 [0  ¡1] and log-concave for  2 [ ¡1 1).
We now compute the optimal price directly. The … rst-order condition is
¡log ¡
( ¡  ¡  )

= 0 (10)




 +  + 
, so that 
0( ) 1
This establishes that the conclusion of Proposition 8 holds although the concomitant
assumption –log-concavity of  –fails to hold globally (cf. (9)), i.e. on the set
f(     ) : 0 ·  · 1 and  +  ·  g
It turns out that a variant of Proposition 8 will have a bearing on this example (see
the next proposition.) To provide a preview, … rst observe that it follows from (10) that
the optimal monopoly price corresponding to  =  = 0 is such that ¡log (0)¡1 = 0,
or  (0) =  ¡1 t  368. In view of Proposition 7, we know that as  is increased from
0 (with still = 0),  ( )   (0) =  ¡1, for all  0, with this conclusion being
independent of any assumptions on ! Indeed, (9) shows that here is log-concave
on [ ¡1 1] which is all that is needed for the conclusion that  0( ) · 1 For the
stronger conclusion that  0( ) 1, one needs to apply the same reasoning to the dual
of Theorem 3, an extension that is not pursued any further below.
This motivates the following generalization of Proposition 8.
Proposition 15 Let  (0) denote the optimal monopoly price when = 0, with 
… xed. If  is log-concave on [ (0) 1), then there is a unique optimal price  ( ) for
all  0 and it satis… es 0 
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ · 1 for all  0  0
Proof. By Proposition 7, we know that  ( )   (0) for all  0. Hence,
( ) =  ( ) ¡  ¡ ¸  (0) ¡  ¡   So ( ) µ [ (0) ¡  ¡   1) for all ¸
150 Hence, the … rm’ s best-response problem in (7) may be equivalently restated as
maxf(+  ) : 2 [ (0) ¡  ¡   1)g. Since is log-concave on [ (0) 1), log e ¦(  )
is strictly concave in 2 [ (0)¡ ¡  1) (being the sum of a strictly concave function
and a concave function). Hence, there is a unique optimal price  ( ) for all  0
Since  is log-concave on [ (0) 1) the objective function log e ¦(  ) is log-
submodular in (  ) on the set f(  ) :  ¸ 0 and  2 [ (0) ¡  ¡   1)g. Fur-
thermore, the feasible set [ (0) ¡  ¡   1) is obviously descending in  . Hence, by
Theorem 4, ( ) is decreasing in  , or equivalently
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ · 1 for all  0  0 The
0 bound on slopes follows from previous results.
Interestingly, the bound  ¡1 in Example 14 is tight and captures the full force of
Proposition 15 as an improvement over Proposition 8, in that the set of prices for
which log-concavity of demand fails to hold coincides exactly with the set of prices
lower than the optimal price of the zero-cost monopoly. As it turns out, although
demand is log-convex for small prices and log-concave for large prices, Example 14
does not really represent a hybrid case, due to the fact that not all possible prices are
reached along an optimal behavior path for the monopolist, generated by varying  , as
a consequence of Proposition 7, which holds for all (upper semi-continuous) demand
functions. Only those prices above  (0) will ever be reached, so that any binding
restriction on demand need only be imposed on such prices.
We now provide a result dealing with actual hybrid cases.
Proposition 16 Suppose that there exists some e  (0) such that  is log-convex
on [0 e  ) and log-concave on [e   1). Then there exists a e such that the extremal
selections of  ( ) satisfy
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ ¸ 1 for all   0 e  and 0 
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ · 1 for all
 0  e  
Proof. From Proposition 7, we know that all the selections of  ( ) are always
strictly increasing globally, regardless of any curvature properties of . Let e  be
the largest value of satisfying  (e  ¡) · e ·  (e  +) (note that this de… nition of e 
16re‡ ects the fact that if  ( ) is continuous at e  , then e  is thereby simply de… ned by
 (e  ) = e  ) By the assumption of the proposition on , we conclude that (+ + )
is log-supermodular in (  ) 2 f(  ) : +  + · e  g and log-submodular on
f(  ) : e · +  +  1g The proof now follows by invoking, for the pro… t
maximization problem, Proposition 10 for (   ) 2 [0 e  ] £ [ +   e  ] and Proposition 8
for (   ) 2 [e   1] £ [e   1].
We next provide an illustrative example of a hybrid case that closely … ts this
Proposition.
Example 17 Let ( ) = log
2 for 0  · 1 and 0 for  ¸ 1, and  = 0
While this demand function might appear unusual, it does give rise to a well-
behaved pro… t function that is quasi-concave in price. Note also that as long as 0 
 · 1, this demand is indeed downward-sloping, and that the pro… t function is bounded
at  = 0, although demand is not (see below.) The veri… cation details of these points
are left out for the sake of brevity.














 2 (log + 1)
Hence, as in Example 14,

00 ¡ 
02 Q 0 according as  R 
¡1 t 0 368 (11)
We now compute the optimal price directly. The pro… t function is
¦(   ) = ( ¡  )log
2   with  ·  · 1
The … rst-order condition reduces to9
log + 2
( ¡  )

= 0 (12)
9There is also another solution of the … rst-order condition at  = 1, which turns out to be a local
minimum, and is thus ignored w.l.o.g.
17Hence,  (0) =  ¡2. As no closed-form solution is possible here, implicit di¤erentiation






While this does not allow a direct conclusion as in Example 14, it follows from (13)
that  0(0) = 2 ¡2  ¡2 = 2, so that  0( ) is not globally 1. In fact, it can be shown
numerically (with details omitted for brevity) that

0( ) R 1 according as  Q 0 182
Overall then, this example is a neat illustration of Proposition 15, with the follow-
ing identi… cation of the relevant constants: e  =  ¡1 t 0 368 and e  t 0 182
Finally, we state a result concerning a hybrid case with a demand function that
is log-concave for low prices and log-convex for high prices.
Proposition 18 Suppose that there exists some e   (0) such that is log-concave
on [0 e  ) and log-convex on [e   1). Then there exists a e such that the extremal
selections of  ( ) satisfy 0 
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ · 1 for all   0 e  and
 ( 0)¡ ( )
 0¡ ¸ 1 for all
 0  e  
The proof is left out as it is similar to the proof of the previous proposition.
4 A Policy-Oriented Discussion and Conclusion
We now provide a discussion of some simple policy implications of the above results.
It is well-known that an excise tax is a generally undesirable way of taxing … rms in
comparison say to a lump-sum tax, in view of the distortive e¤ects the former nec-
essarily generates. In fact, this may be considered as a general principle of taxation.
Yet at the same time, per-unit taxes on production are relatively common, in partic-
ular as a way of regulating pollution-producing … rms, as these are situations in which
the concomitant output decline engenders an environmental bene… t.
18To the extent that excise taxes are used as policy tools on a regular basis, it is
important to understand their relative e¤ects, in as much detail as possible. In par-
ticular, regulators ought to be fully informed about the consequences of this form of
taxation on consumer welfare. The results presented in this paper allow in particular
for a better handle on the e¤ects of such taxes on pro… ts and on consumer welfare,
as a function of the … rm’ s current cost structure, which may be a re‡ ection of the
technological state of the … rm.
While … rms are always hurt by the imposition of such taxes, Proposition 6 also
provides the conclusion that pro… ts fall at a decreasing rate with the current unit cost
of the … rm. In other words, high-cost or small … rms tend to su¤er less than low-cost
or large … rms from a given unit tax increase (in absolute terms.)
As to the e¤ect on consumer surplus, it is naturally always negative as price
necessarily ends up moving upward (Proposition 7). Furthermore, it is also of interest
to learn that this detrimental e¤ect is worse when the market direct demand is log-
convex than when it is log-concave, since tax pass-through exceeds 100% in the former
case, while it is below 100% in the latter case.
In so-called hybrid cases, where the demand function changes curvature, going
from an initial log-convex part to a log-concave part, tax pass-through is more than
100% for small values of the … rm’ s unit cost (or relatively e¢cient … rms) and less
than 100% for high values of the unit cost (or ine¢cient … rms). For demand functions
having the reverse shape con… guration, the result is simply accordingly reversed.
One can therefore draw some interesting conclusions in terms of the relative ap-
propriateness of this form of taxation depending on the demand characteristics of
industries. In cases with a demand function that is log-convex initially (as in Propo-
sition 16), consumers will be prejudiced relatively more in case the tax incidence
applies to an e¢cient … rm than if it applies to an ine¢cient … rm.10 Given the focus
10This result is reminiscent of the Boiteux-Ramsey taxation principle, which essentially states that
commodities with low elasticities of substitution can be more e¤ectively taxed than commodities
with higher elasticities of substitution.
19of the present paper to the case of a monopoly … rm, the above policy conclusion is
not a priori applicable to two e¢ciency-di¤erentiated … rms operating in the same
industry, unless we ignore all the strategic e¤ects. The same conclusion is however
applicable to two e¢ciency-di¤erentiated … rms operating in two di¤erent industries,
if the regulatory authority comtemplates possibly taxing only one of them.
Interestingly, this conclusion gives rise to a testable hypothesis for which data
ought to be relatively easy to collect. Within comparable industries in which general
features about the shape of the demand function are known, is it often the case that
… rms of a given size are taxed more frequently than … rms of the alternative size,
according to the above theoretical conclusion?
By limiting consideration to monopoly … rms, this analysis has ignored strategic
e¤ects in the market, which are known to be important co-determinants of the e¤ects
of taxation on pro… ts and consumer surplus (see Seade, 1985 and Kimmel, 1992.) This
remains a topic for future research along the same methodological lines. Of particular
interest is to investigate whether the aforementioned conclusion about e¢ciency-
di¤erentiated taxation carries through to an oligopoly setting with explicit strategic
interaction..
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